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Immigration and Aging
Why Are the Elderly More
Averse to Immigration
When They Are More








Using household surveys for 25 countries over a 12-year period, this paper
investigates why the elderly are more averse to open immigration policies than
their younger peers. We find that the negative correlation between age and
pro-immigration attitudes is mostly explained by a cohort or generational change.
In fact, once we control for year of birth, the correlation between age and
pro-immigration attitudes is either positive or zero in most of the countries of our
sample. Under certain assumptions, our estimates suggest that aging societies will
tend to become less averse to open immigration regimes over time.
Introduction
Most developed economies are expected to experience dramatic demographic
changes in the near future. While there are currently four working-age individuals
per elderly person in Europe, population projections show that this figure will shrink
by half in 2050 (United Nations 2012). Although the phenomenon of aging
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populations is affecting developed economies almost exclusively nowadays, devel-
oping countries will soon follow as many of them are currently witnessing a decrease
in fertility and mortality rates. There is an increasingly large body of literature
analyzing the potential consequences of the aging process on economic growth,
fiscal outcomes, and the sustainability of pension systems (European Commission
2012). In face of a shrinking working-age population, measures to encourage the
immigration of foreign workers could provide a promising policy option to help
mitigate the aging process and its effects on the economy.
Even though the potential welfare gains from a more open immigration regime
are enormous, most individuals tend to display high levels of opposition against
increased immigration (see, e.g. Facchini and Mayda 2008; Card, Dustmann, and
Preston 2012). In this context, the elderly represent one of the demographic groups
with the highest levels of opposition to open immigration regimes in most countries
(see Figure 1; also see Mayda 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Card, Dustmann,
and Preston 2012). This stylized fact is striking as the elderly tend to be out of the
labor force and thereby less likely to experience the potential short-term negative
effects of immigration than working-age individuals. Given that individual prefer-
ences play a decisive role in the policy agenda, these empirical patterns raise con-
cerns about the future of immigration policies in an aging world as the elderly will
represent an increasingly larger share of the voting population.
Despite these concerns, the relationship between age and attitudes toward
immigrants observed in cross-sectional surveys — even when controlling for other
observable characteristics — cannot directly be interpreted as reflecting a change
in attitudes over the life cycle. The old not only differ from the young in terms of
age, but they were also born and raised in a different time, and in a different
economic and institutional context. In fact, the observed patterns could reflect
different preferences across cohorts or generations. For instance, if older cohorts
grew up in a context of lower levels of international immigration than their
younger counterparts did, they could have very different perceptions about immi-
grants that may remain fixed throughout their lives.1 Hence, the relationship
between age and attitudes toward immigrants observed in a cross section could
be driven by both an age effect — that is, the fact that attitudes change with age —
and a cohort effect — that is, the fact that attitudes are different across generations.
If the cross-sectional age patterns were fully explained by a cohort effect, the
political support for more open immigration regimes could actually increase in the
future as younger cohorts replace those who are more averse toward increased
1There is empirical evidence that life experiences at certain age levels can explain why some
generations have different policy preferences than others. For example, Giuliano and Spi-
limbergo (2014) find that large macroeconomic shocks experienced during the critical years
of adolescence and early adulthood, between the ages of 18 and 25, shape preferences for
redistribution.
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immigration. To our knowledge, this paper provides the first attempt to disentangle
these effects for a large group of countries.
Economic theory suggests that individual attitudes would either be stable over the
life cycle or become more pro-immigration as, for instance, older individuals are less
likely to work and thereby less exposed to immigrants’ competition in the labor
market. In contrast, most of the empirical literature on this subject finds that older
individuals are more averse toward immigration than their younger peers (see, for
instance, Mayda 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Facchini and Mayda 2009; Card,
Dustmann, and Preston 2012). Nevertheless, the age effect regarding preferences on
immigration reported in most empirical studies includes both a true age effect and a
cohort effect. To our knowledge, the only paper that attempts to separate these effects
is Calahorrano (2013). Using panel data for Germany between 1999 and 2010, she
finds that older cohorts are generally more averse to immigration in Germany. How-
ever, despite this generational effect, immigration concerns actually decrease over the
life cycle relative to other issues. These results are in sharp contrast to those that come
from a specification that does not control for year of birth.
To disentangle the age and cohort effects on attitudes toward immigrants, we use
an approach similar to Calahorrano (2013). However, given the lack of comparable
panel data surveys for a large group of countries, we use pooled cross sections from
the European Social Survey (ESS) for the period 2002 to 2014. Using these repeated
































































































age gap 55 or older younger 55
Figure 1. Positive attitudes toward immigrants of different race/ethnic group (gap between
young and older than 55).
Source: Attitudes toward migrants were estimated from European Social Survey (see Data
section for more details). The gap reflects the difference between the positive attitudes of
individuals aged 54 years or younger minus the positive attitudes of individuals aged 55 years
or older. Design weights used.
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effects of age, cohort, and time on attitudes toward migrants. While this estimation
strategy is less ideal than one based on actual longitudinal data as in Calahorrano
(2013), it has been extensively used in the literature to identify cohort and age effects
when the latter is not available (see, e.g. Deaton and Paxson 1994; Fernández-
Villaverde and Krueger 2007; Aristei, Perali, and Pieroni 2008).
We first confirm the stylized fact found in the literature that older individuals are
more averse than their younger peers with regard to immigration. However, when
controlling for birth cohort, our estimates become more consistent with the predic-
tions of economic theory, as the estimated age effect turns either positive or not
statistically different from zero for most countries. In only four of the 25 countries in
our sample, the age effect remains negative and significant.2 This paper contributes
to the literature by showing that the result found by Calahorrano (2013) for Germany
holds for a larger set of countries. Moreover, this paper also shows that the results are
robust to using different measures of attitudes toward immigration.
Attitudes toward Immigration over the Life Cycle
Three main channels have been identified that may contribute to shape the attitudes
of natives toward immigration. First, immigration can have an impact on the income
distribution of the recipient economy through the labor market. On the one hand,
native workers whose skills are very similar to those of the immigrant population
tend to be concerned that the inflow of migrant workers may cause downward
pressure on wages and increase labor market competition and thus the risk of
unemployment. This concern, however, does not take into consideration that the
effect of immigration on real wage income will also depend on the evolution of
prices on the market of goods and services. If immigration reduces unskilled wages,
this will tend to decrease the prices of low-skill-intensive goods and services,
thereby raising the welfare of consumers (Cortes 2008). On the other hand, capital
owners and workers whose skills complement those of immigrants are likely to
benefit from a more open immigration regime.
Second, preferences on immigration may also be shaped by perceptions regarding
the impact of immigration on fiscal outcomes. Different implications arise depend-
ing on whether a tax-adjustment or benefit-adjustment social security system is
assumed. Facchini and Mayda (2009) find evidence consistent with the tax-adjust-
ment model, where following an inflow of unskilled workers that may demand social
assistance, tax rates would be increased to balance the government’s budget. In this
case, high-income individuals are more negatively affected by unskilled
2It is important to mention that while we refer to the coefficients associated with age and
cohort as “effects,” we are not implying any causality but instead following the standard
terminology used in cohort studies such as Deaton and Paxson (1997) and Calahorrano
(2013).
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immigration than low-income individuals, as they bear most of the additional cost to
the welfare system. However, they are more positively affected than low-income
individuals by an inflow of skilled migrants who would add to the tax base. Contrarily,
Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) find evidence consistent with the benefit-adjustment
model, where lower-income natives are more likely to oppose low-skilled immigration
because of concerns regarding overcrowding of public services.
Third, attitudes toward immigrants may also be affected by other factors such as
opposition to different social norms and customs, as well as ethnic prejudice. Card,
Dustmann, and Preston (2012) use the ESS to measure the relative importance of
economic and compositional concerns — which are crucial to understand discrim-
ination toward immigrants — in driving opinions about immigration policy. While
they find that concerns over the effect of immigration on wages and taxes are
important, differences in compositional concerns explain most of the variation in
attitudes toward immigration across different native demographic groups. Finally,
and related to this topic, there is a large body of empirical evidence about the
sociocultural drivers of attitudes toward immigration outside the economics litera-
ture. For example, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007, 2010) find little evidence regard-
ing concerns about labor market competition as an important driver of attitudes
toward immigrants in Europe and the United States. In contrast, their results are
more consistent with these attitudes being propelled by deep-rooted cultural and
ideological factors, such as racism and nationalism; or by people’s perceptions of the
impact of immigration on the nation as a whole, instead of their own self-interest.
These three channels have implications regarding the relationship between the
age of an individual and his or her position regarding immigration. Regarding
the first channel, given that older individuals are more likely to be out of the labor
force — and thereby less concerned about the impact of immigrants on the labor
market — and to have more savings than their younger counterparts — and thereby
benefit from the increasing returns to capital brought about by immigration — they
would have more incentives to support a more open immigration regime than their
younger peers. At the same time, the impact of immigration on prices of goods and
services intensive in migrants’ work may also affect the attitudes toward immigra-
tion over the life cycle depending on the consumption patterns of these goods and
services by age. Finally, if young and old workers are complementary factors of
production, then even old individuals who are still in the labor force may benefit
from immigration as migrants tend to be younger. In fact, there is evidence that
establishments with mixed age teams have a higher productivity not only of older
workers but also of young employees, suggesting that they are complementary factors
of production (Göbel and Zwick 2013). Accordingly, Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994)
find that both in the United States and in Europe, an inflow of unskilled immigrants
tends to raise the returns to experience in the host country. Peri and Sparber (2009)
find that foreign-born workers in the United States specialize in occupations intensive
in manual-physical labor skills which could be complementary to tasks of older
individuals, as they would be less likely to have physically demanding jobs.
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For the second channel, the life cycle effect on attitudes toward immigrants is
most likely to operate through the impact of immigration on the sustainability of
pension systems. Pension arrangements provided by the state in most European
countries are unfunded pay-as-you-go pension schemes (PAYG), which means that
no assets are set aside and benefits are paid directly from current workers’ contri-
butions and taxes (although several countries have hybrid systems which are par-
tially funded). Under such a system, the life cycle pattern of natives’ attitudes toward
a more open immigration regime may vary, depending on whether pension benefits
are fixed or tied to the wage level (Casarico and Devillanova 2003).
In an aging economy with an unfunded PAYG pension plan and defined (fixed)
benefits, an inflow of migrant workers would improve the fiscal sustainability of the
system. In such a setting, the elderly would be indifferent with respect to the way that
their fixed pension receipts are funded, but they would still benefit from the increas-
ing capital returns and decreasing prices of certain goods and services associated
with immigration under the first channel. On the other hand, even though potentially
still facing a decline in wages, those currently in the labor force would benefit from a
declining social security contribution rate today and from immigrant’s descendants
contributing to their pension benefits in the future (Sand and Razin 2007). Thereby,
the old’s and young’s preferences are closer together under this scenario than in one
without a PAYG system (Calahorrano 2010).
By contrast, in a PAYG system where pension levels follow a wage growth index,
older individuals will vote for a more restrictive immigration regime if they perceive
that immigration will decrease wages (Scholten and Thum 1996; Haupt and Peters
1998). In other words, both retired and working-age individuals would be affected
by the negative impact of immigration on wages. On the other hand, young workers
would also benefit from a lower social security contribution rate. Thereby, the age
gap in preferences toward immigration would also be smaller in this case than in a
scenario without a PAYG system. Razin and Sadka (1999) argue that assuming
perfect capital mobility and forward-looking individuals, the age gap in preferences
would also be smaller in a PAYG system with fixed contributions and flexible
pension benefits than in an economy without a pension system.
The first and second channels implicitly assume that attitudes toward immigrants
are shaped by distributional concerns that affect individuals at different stages of
their life cycle differently. However, the validity of the above considerations will
depend on the degree to which preferences actually react to these economic con-
cerns. Theories and research in the fields of sociology and psychology show that
political attitudes and opinions are shaped during youth and tend to remain stable
over the life cycle (Alwin and Krosnick 1991).3 These considerations point to the
3In particular, the impressionable-years hypothesis sustains that attitudes become more stable
immediately following early adulthood and remain stable throughout the remainder of the
life cycle.
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potential importance of the third channel in explaining differences in attitudes
toward immigrants between younger and older natives. Compositional concerns
(e.g., with respect to the ethnic composition of society) regarding immigration can
be assumed to be mainly driven by prejudice and related factors that are likely to
remain stable during the life cycle. The empirical finding that most of the age gap in
attitudes toward immigration is driven by compositional rather than by labor market
concerns (Card, Dustmann, and Preston 2012) would suggest that the more negative
attitudes of the elderly toward immigration tend to be the result of differences across
cohorts rather than a life cycle pattern.
Evidence from the political science literature also suggests that noneconomic
factors would help explain that different attitudes toward immigration across age
groups are the result of generational differences rather than life cycle factors
(see Hainmueller and Hiscox [2007, 2010] for a review of this literature). More
specifically, if education tends to make people more tolerant, open to foreign
cultures, and prone to critical thinking, we would expect that such traits would
remain stable over the life cycle for individuals of the same cohort. Moreover, if
changes in the education system over time contribute to explain the cohort differ-
ences in terms of attitudes toward migrants, this might imply that the negative
correlation between age and attitudes toward immigration may become weaker
when we control for year of birth.
In summary, while the labor market channel predicts that older individuals should
be less averse to immigration than their younger counterparts, under a PAYG system
the preferences regarding immigration across age groups should be more similar.
Finally, older individuals could be more averse to immigration because of noneco-
nomic factors such as compositional concerns and different levels of tolerance and
openness. If this is the case, we would expect that the negative correlation between age
and attitudes toward immigration is mostly driven by a generational or cohort effect.
Data and Methodology
Ideally, to determine how perceptions change over the life cycle, we would like
to follow individuals over time. However, long-running panels are rare in both
developed and developing countries. To identify age patterns using repeated
cross-sectional data, Deaton and Paxson (1994) and Deaton (1997) suggest an iden-
tification strategy that instead of tracking individuals follows the evolution of cohort
averages over time. The procedure consists in dividing the individuals in the sample
in cells defined by time-invariant characteristics such as year of birth and averaging
the variable of interest over individuals belonging to each cell; then, the authors
estimate a linear model using the variable of interest as a dependent variable, and
cohort, age, and year dummy variables as independent variables. As we want to
control for certain individual characteristics that change over the life cycle and are
likely to affect the degree of pro-immigration attitudes, we estimate the models
using stacked microdata from the cross-sectional surveys instead of averaging over
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time-invariant characteristics. As a robustness check, we also construct a birth
cohort panel and estimate the model using the standard decomposition approach
as suggested by Deaton (1997) and the results are very similar to the ones reported in
the paper. It is important to mention that estimators using pseudo-panel have a
disadvantage when compared to actual longitudinal data in terms of precision, as
the latter allow to follow individuals belonging to the same cohorts over time and
have a higher number of observations (Verbeek and Nijman 1992). On the other
hand, pseudo-panels are less affected by attrition issues than longitudinal surveys
(Antman and McKenzie 2007).
To identify the effect of age on attitudes toward migration, we append household
surveys from multiple years and estimate the following probit model:



















where yi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i exhibits pro-immigrant
attitudes, and 0 otherwise; AGE and COHORT are dummy variables representing
the individuals’ age and cohort, respectively; and YEAR is a year dummy variable.
The cohort or year-of-birth dummy variables are introduced in five-year intervals to
avoid losing more degrees of freedom. Regarding the age and cohort effects, we
estimate two alternative specifications, one using age and cohort dummy variables
and another one where they enter the equation in a linear form.
The set of variables x contains individual characteristics such as gender, income,
education, employment status, and other public benefits. The results presented in the
next section do not control for whether the respondent is a pensioner or not, as we want
to capture the effects of pensions, savings returns, and labor market outcomes on
individual attitudes through an individual’s age. The main reason for this decision is
that we would expect that attitudes toward migration would not change in a discrete step
as the person starts receiving pensions but rather change slowly during the life cycle as
the person approaches retirement (Haupt and Peters [1998] explicitly consider this issue
in their model of immigration and public pensions). In particular, if individuals are
forward-looking, we would expect that as they approach retirement, they would gra-
dually weight more heavily the positive effects of immigration on capital returns than its
negative effects on the labor market even if they are in the labor force. As a robustness
check, we also estimate a specification to test whether the age patterns change when
controlling for pensioner status, but our main findings were not affected.4
4The results are available from the authors upon request.
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There is a large literature regarding the identification of age, cohort, and year
effects (see McKenzie 2006; Schulhofer-Wohl 2013). A well-known challenge in
this literature is that such effects cannot be identified without making specific
assumptions, as they are perfectly collinear. We follow Deaton and Paxson
(1994) and Deaton (1997) and implement their normalization of the year effects.
By applying this approach, we assume that the year effects capture cyclical fluc-
tuations that average to zero over the long run and are orthogonal to a time trend, so
that all deterministic changes in the dependent variable are interpreted as a com-
bination of age and cohort effects. More specifically, we use the following trans-
formed year effects:
dt ¼ dt  ½ðt  1Þd2  ðt  2Þd1;
from t ¼ 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and where dt is the year dummy variable,
equal to 1 if the year is t and 0 otherwise (Deaton 1997).
The data for this paper come from the ESS for the survey years 2002, 2004, 2006,
2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. The survey contains about 1,500 to 2,500 individual
observations per country/year. The ESS covers 36 countries, 25 of which are
included in our analysis as only those were surveyed in at least four years and
thereby allow to observe at least two cohorts with the same age, a requirement to
disentangle cohort and age effects. We exclude noncitizens from the sample, as we
want to capture the preferences of potential voters.
Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2012) investigate the drivers of attitudes toward
immigrants in Europe using, among others, the following variables of the ESS:
1. To what extent do you think (this country) should allow people of the same
race or ethnic group as most people to come and live here?
2. To what extent do you think (this country) should allow people of a different
race or ethnic group from most people to come and live here?
Where the possible answers to each question are:
1. Allow many to come and live here;
2. Allow some;
3. Allow a few;
4. Allow none;
5. Don’t know.
These questions may not be strictly comparable across countries, as the answers
could be affected by a host of other factors such as the current stock and composition
of immigrants in each country. However, while we are aware of this limitation, the
ESS has been extensively used in papers studying the determinants of attitudes
toward immigration across countries (see, for instance, Facchini and Mayda 2009;
Card, Dustmann, and Preston 2012). Moreover, Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2012)
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mention that these questions in the ESS eliminate ambiguities by referring to people
who come to live in a country, rather than to immigrants. In countries where citizen-
ship is based on blood ancestry such as Germany, a translation of immigrants would
include people who were born in the country but are not citizens.
We then create two alternative measures of pro-immigration attitudes. The first
variable (proimmigsame) is equal to 1 if the individual would like many or some
immigrants of the same race or ethnic group as the majority, and 0 otherwise (i.e., if
the individual would like few immigrants or none from the same race or ethnic
group). The second variable (proimmigdiff) is constructed following the same cri-
teria used for proimmigsame, but it refers to immigrants of a different race or ethnic
group from most people in the country. While proimmigsame is less likely to capture
compositional concerns regarding immigration and more likely to capture purely
economic concerns, proimmigdiff is more likely to capture a mix of both concerns
regarding immigration (see Table 1). In contrast to the variable used by Calahorrano
(2013), these two variables have a more direct connection with immigration policies.
More specifically, while her measure is based on a survey question of how con-
cerned individuals are regarding immigration in general, the ESS questions expli-
citly ask individuals about how open they believe borders should be. Moreover, the
ESS makes the distinction between immigrants from the same or different race or
ethnicity than the local population. As we find roughly the same patterns using either
proimmigsame or proimmigdiff, we report the results using only proimmigdiff as the
dependent variable and highlight the few cases where the results are different.
Figures reporting the results for the proimmigsame variable can be found in the
Supplemental Appendix S1.
Before discussing the results, we provide some intuition behind the methodology to
identify age and cohort effects. Figure 2 shows the share of individuals by age in
Germany reporting positive attitudes toward immigrants. We draw a separate line for
each cohort, with older cohorts being toward the right. Each line has, in general, a
positive slope, showing that individuals within each cohort become more pro-
immigration as they become older; that is, the age effects can be expected to be positive.
On the other hand, the lines shift downward for older cohorts, showing that younger
cohorts are on average less averse to immigrants than their older counterparts used to be
at the same age; that is, the cohort effects (or year-of-birth effects) can also be expected
to be positive. This figure also illustrates one of the main limitations of this methodol-
ogy, that is, that we do not observe a single cohort from the beginning of the life cycle
until the end. Instead, we observe several and partially overlapping cohorts and assume
that the detected age profiles also hold for those cohorts that are not observed at a given
age. This is a strong assumption, given that the estimated profiles are based on the
behavior observed in a given economic environment over a restricted time period.
As indicated above, another limitation of the methodology is that due to the
transformation of the year effects implemented to address the multicollinearity of
age, cohort, and year fixed effects, any deterministic trends in attitudes toward
immigration are interpreted as a combination of age and cohort effects.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Age and Cohort Effects on Attitudes toward Immigration:
Estimation Results
Table 2 shows the marginal effects from equation (1) using the pooled samples.
Columns (1) and (2) do not control for birth cohort and, as expected, the coefficient
associated with age is negative. Their magnitudes imply, for instance, that an indi-
vidual aged 50 years is on average 2.7 and 1.4 percent less likely than an individual
aged 40 years to have positive attitude attitudes toward migrants of the same or
different race or ethnicity, respectively. However, when we control for birth cohort,
the coefficient associated with age becomes positive but statistically not different
from zero. The negative correlation between age and positive attitudes toward
immigrants is now being captured by the cohort variable, as older generations are
less likely to display positive attitudes toward immigration than their younger coun-
terparts. It is also interesting that the coefficients associated with education and
household income are positive and statistically significant in all four columns.
However, the results using the pooled country samples in Table 2 hide significant
heterogeneity across countries. Figure 3 shows the estimated marginal effects of
age from equation (1) using the dependent variable proimmigdiff and two
specifications — both excluding the set of individual controls, Xi. The first one only
includes age and survey year as explanatory variables (light-colored line); we call
















20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Age
Germany
Positive attitudes toward immigrants of different race/ethnic group
Figure 2. Positive Attitudes toward Immigrants by Age and Cohort in Germany.
Note: Each line shows the positive attitudes toward immigrants by age. Each line shows age
patterns for each cohort, with older cohorts being toward the right.
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emerge from cross-sectional survey data. The second specification incorporates age,
year-of-birth, and survey year dummy variables as explanatory variables (dark-
colored line with confidence intervals). According to the model without any cohort
controls, older people are less likely to exhibit positive attitudes toward immigrants
than their younger peers in almost all countries considered. For instance, an 80-year-
old individual in Estonia is about 30 percent less likely to report positive attitudes
toward immigrants than an individual 20 years old or younger. Nevertheless,
this stylized relationship becomes weaker when controlling for cohort effects. The
dark-colored lines with confidence intervals show the life cycle pattern of attitudes
toward immigrants. When controlling for year of birth, the age effects completely
reverse in 13 countries — the most dramatic changes are observed in Austria,
Estonia, Germany, and the Netherlands — showing that in those economies, the
more negative attitudes of older individuals toward immigrants are primarily driven
Table 2. Average Marginal Effects on Positive Attitudes toward Immigration.





















Age 0.0027*** 0.0014*** 0.0021 0.0023
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0020) (0.0018)




0.0055 0.0031 0.0055 0.0031
(0.0079) (0.0067) (0.0078) (0.0067)
Tertiary education 0.1538*** 0.1314*** 0.1543*** 0.1318***
(0.0110) (0.0094) (0.0112) (0.0095)
Household’s total net
income, all sources
0.0082*** 0.0103*** 0.0081*** 0.0102***
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018)
Work for income 0.0035 0.0045 0.0036 0.0043
(0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0044)
Have an unlimited
labor contract
0.0025 0.0039 0.0024 0.0039
(0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0039)
Social benefits or
grants
0.0055 0.0184 0.0054 0.0183
(0.0158) (0.0138) (0.0159) (0.0138)
Observation 208,960 209,330 208,960 209,330
R2 0.0940 0.0808 0.0939 0.0807
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes 25 countries listed in Table 3, country fixed effects
included, and standard errors clustered at the country level. Design weights used in regression. Columns
(1) and (2) include year dummies; columns (3) and (4) include transformed year dummies as in Deaton
(1997). In columns (3) and (4), birth cohort refers to year of birth; thereby, the higher the number, the
younger the cohort.
***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1.
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by a generational change. In other words, these results imply that in these countries
within each cohort, the attitudes toward immigrants are expected to become more
positive over the life cycle. For instance, in the case of Estonia, the age effect implies
that when an individual reaches age 80, he will be expected to be about 50 percent
more likely to display positive attitudes toward immigrants than when he was 20
years old. In contrast, the age effects become more negative when we control for
cohort of birth in the Czech Republic, Ireland, and Slovakia. In other words, the
more negative attitudes of the elderly toward immigrants among these countries
seem to be driven by natives becoming more averse to immigrants throughout the
life cycle.
Figure 4 displays the estimated cohort effects and shows that the generational
change in the attitudes toward immigrants was significant among most of these
economies, with younger cohorts being more welcoming of immigrants than their
older counterparts in all countries except the Czech Republic, Ireland, Israel,
Slovakia, and Greece. This finding is consistent with previous evidence that the
more negative attitudes of the elderly toward immigrants are driven by composi-
tional concerns instead of economic ones (Card, Dustmann, and Preston 2012), as
policy attitudes are shaped during youth and remain stable thereafter (Alwin and
Krosnick 1991). In addition, it is consistent with the literature pointing out the
importance of cultural and ideational mechanisms to explain different levels of
attitudes toward immigration, as they are likely to remain stable over the life cycle
for a given cohort. This result also implies that over time, older cohorts will be
replaced by new generations with a more positive perception of immigration in most
of the countries in our sample.
The finding that attitudes toward immigration by age are largely unaffected by
the race and ethnicity of migrants is puzzling. When comparing Figure 3 and Figure
A2 in the Supplemental Appendix S1, there are only three countries — Denmark,
Greece, and Russia — where the attitudes toward immigration by age are sensitive to
whether they refer to immigrants from the same or different race and ethnicity.5
However, the main finding is that the results are quite robust to the race or ethnicity
of immigrants. The implications of both the empirical and theoretical literature of
5More specifically, while natives in Denmark become more pro-immigration over the life
cycle with respect to people from a different race or ethnicity, the age profile is rather flat
with respect to immigrants from the same race or ethnicity. The reverse holds in Russia.
Finally, while natives in Greece become significantly more pro-immigration of individuals
of the same race or ethnicity, the age profile is rather flat (or with a slightly negative slope)
with respect to immigrants from a different race or ethnicity. While the results for Greece are
more consistent with a body of literature arguing that individuals become less liberal and
thereby more concerned with compositional concerns over the life cycle (see, for instance,
Tilley and Evans 2014; De Mello et al. 2017), the results for Russia and Denmark are sur-
prising and could be an interesting topic for future research.
Schotte and Winkler 1265

























































































































































































































































































































































the political economy of immigration reforms outlined above suggest that the more
positive attitudes of older individuals would mostly be driven by economic factors
— which would be better reflected by the attitudes toward immigrants of the same
race or ethnicity — rather than by lower levels of ethnic and racial prejudice —
which are unlikely to vary with age. Our findings could reflect the fact that the
prejudice of natives against immigrants is not as much related to their ethnic back-
ground so as to other immigrants’ socioeconomic characteristics.
Figure 5 shows the estimated nonparametric age effects from equation (1) with
and without controlling for other individual socioeconomic characteristics such as
education, income, and gender. In general, including such control variables does not
change significantly the patterns that emerge from the estimated age effects. In other
words, the empirical results are driven by aging itself and not by other individual
characteristics that may vary or not over the life cycle. Some exceptions include
Ireland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Switzerland — where the age patterns become less
steep — as well as Bulgaria.
To better summarize our results and their statistical significance, Table 3 shows the
coefficients and standard errors estimated using a probit model with both age and
cohort of birth in linear form, and controlling for individual and household charac-
teristics x.6 These results confirm the above conclusions: Regardless of the racial or
ethnic composition of immigrants, older individuals across most economies are more
averse to immigration. However, this stylized fact is driven by a cohort effect. When
controlling for year of birth, the effect of age on attitudes toward immigration becomes
statistically insignificant or positive in most countries considered, and this is indepen-
dent of the ethnicity or race of the immigrants. The fact that the coefficient associated
with the year of birth is positive and statistically significant in many countries con-
firms the fact that the negative correlation between age and pro-immigration attitudes
is driven mostly by older cohorts being more averse to immigration. It is important to
keep in mind the caveat that these estimates might be affected by attenuation bias.
However, as most countries in the sample are developed or middle-income economies,
age and cohort are likely to be reported precisely in the survey.
Robustness Checks
This section explores the robustness of the main results under two different scenar-
ios. First, we test whether the results are affected by the specification of the trend
component. Second, we examine whether the results could be driven by the short
time span considered (10 years).
6Table A1 in the Supplemental Appendix S1 shows that the results are the same when using a
linear probability model (i.e., ordinary least squares).
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Are Age Effects Capturing Trends?
As mentioned above, we use the normalization proposed by Deaton and Paxson
(1994) to the trend so that it captures a cyclical component of attitudes. However,
as mentioned by Deaton (1997), this procedure is dangerous when there are a few
surveys, as it is difficult to separate trends from transitory components. We estimate
a specification that excludes the transformed dummy variables — and does not
include conventional year dummy variables either — to investigate whether the
cyclical component is an important driver of the results. The results in Figure 6
show that the age profile is basically unaffected when we dropped the cyclical
component in all countries except Poland; in other words, the way the cyclical
component is introduced in the model does not seem to be driving the results.
Is the Period of Time Long Enough to Capture Life Cycle Effects?
It could be argued that the period of time covered by the ESS — from 2002 to
2014 — may not be long enough to capture life cycle patterns. Preferences may
change over a longer period of time, and 12 years cannot cover the same group of
individuals from, for instance, age 20 to age 40. The period of time covered by
papers trying to identify cohort and age effects on attitudes goes from 10 to 46
years.7 Among those studies, Calahorrano (2013) is the closest to our paper and she
also uses 12 years of individual-level longitudinal data from 1999 to 2010.
There is not a specific rule regarding the acceptable number of years of data
required to identify life cycle effects. The methodology used in this paper relies on
the assumption — common in this literature — that the age profiles of different
cohorts are the same for the nonoverlapping age values across cohorts. To test
whether this assumption is robust by whether we use 12 or more years, we need
repeated cross sections covering a period of time longer than 12 years. To our
knowledge, the only dataset that satisfies this requirement is the World Value Survey
(WVS) spanning the years from 1990 to 2011, that is, a period covering 22 years.
Unfortunately, the questions included in the WVS regarding immigrants are quite
different from those of the ESS. Moreover, they are not available for all years, so we
end up with only two countries from the European area: Spain (1990, 1995, 2000,
2007, and 2011) and Turkey (1990, 1996, 2001, 2007, and 2011).
The only question included in the WVS related to attitudes toward immigrants —
and available for a sufficient number of survey years — is: On this list are various
groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as
7For instance, Calahorrano (2013) uses data from 1999 to 2010; Sørensen (2013) uses data
from 1985 to 2006; Tilley and Evans (2014) use data from 1964 to 2010; De Mello et al.
(2017) use data from 2004 to 2013; Fullerton and Dixon (2010) use data from 1984 to 2008;
Rhodebeck (1993) uses data from 1972 to 1988; Street and Cossman (2006) use data from
1988 to 2000; and Svallfors (2008) uses data from 1981 to 2002.
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neighbors? The nonmutually exclusive list of people includes immigrants/foreign
workers (our outcome of interest), as well as drug addicts, people of a different race,
and heavy drinkers, among others. We use this question to test the assumption that
the age profiles of different cohorts are very similar. We estimate equation (1) for
three different subperiods (1990, 1995/1996, and 2000/2001; 1995/1996, 2000/2001,
and 2007; 2000/2001, 2007, and 2011) and compare the estimated age profiles with
those that emerge from using all five surveys covering 20 years. As mentioned
above, the procedure to model year effects is problematic when the number of cross
sections is too small. In this case, as we have only three cross sections for the 10-year
panels, we model the year effects using simple year dummy variables and we
introduce age and cohort in a linear way.
Figure 7 shows the estimated marginal effects of age and cohort for the four
subsamples of Spain and Turkey, as well as their 95 percent confidence intervals.
The effects have the same sign across subperiods for each country, and their
confidence intervals overlap. Figure 8 shows the estimated effects of age and
age-squared; even though the effects are slightly different across years, their
confidence intervals overlap. Unfortunately, in most cases the effects are not
statistically different from zero but, as mentioned at the beginning of this section,
the goal of this robustness check was to test that the effects do not dramatically
differ by using a 10-year pseudo-panel instead of a longer time span. The results
suggest that the assumption that the age profiles of different cohorts are roughly
similar seems to hold in this dataset. However, we should mention the caveat that
we are unable to test the stability of the coefficients over a period of more than 20
years due to lack of data. This limitation should be kept in mind when interpreting
the results of this paper.
Discussion
As mentioned above, one of the main contributions of this paper is to investigate
whether the findings of Calahorrano’s (2013) seminal paper for Germany hold for a
larger set of diverse countries. Our results display significant variation across coun-
tries, which shows that even though the results display some degree of external
validity, they also raise the question of which are the drivers of such differences.
While this task is beyond the scope of this paper, in this section we attempt to
provide some answers. We first discard obvious candidates such as the level of
development or the socialist legacy, as different age and cohort effects do not fall
systematically in either one of these groups.
The literature review section above provides a framework to analyze why the age
effects (after controlling for cohort of birth) vary by country. We use such frame-
work to identify country characteristics that may explain why the age and cohort
effects are different. Given the low number of observations — there are only 25
countries in our sample — we cannot estimate a regression using multiple explana-
tory variables. Therefore, we rely on descriptive statistics to compare countries
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across groups. We classify countries using the coefficients associated with age and
birth cohort reported in Table 3 for the attitudes toward immigrants of a different
race or ethnicity. It is important to note that these coefficients closely match the
graphs of Figure 5, which control for individual characteristics.
We first try to analyze whether differences in the pension system play an impor-
tant role. Unfortunately, we cannot test the hypothesis that the presence of a PAYG




















1990-2001 1995-2007 2001-2011 1990-2011 1990-2001 1995-2007 2001-2011 1990-2011
Spain Turkey
Cohort Effects (linear)
Figure 7. Robustness Check: 10- versus 20-year Pseudo-panels. Linear Marginal Effects.
Note: Each point shows the estimated effect of age and year of birth on the probability of not
mentioning immigrants/foreign workers as a group they would not like as neighbors. The
dashed lines show the 95 percent confidence intervals.
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basically all the countries included in this analysis have either a PAYG system or a
universal pension for the elderly (Schwarz et al. 2014). However, we can test
whether specific features in the countries’ PAYG pension systems contribute to
explain the gap in migration attitudes across countries. In particular, we analyze
whether the correlation between age and attitudes toward immigration varies by
factors that affect the sustainability of pension systems such as demographics. We
expect that older natives would be more likely to favor immigration in economies








1990-2001 1995-2007 2001-2011 1990-2011 1990-2001 1995-2007 2001-2011 1990-2011
Spain Turkey











1990-2001 1995-2007 2001-2011 1990-2011 1990-2001 1995-2007 2001-2011 1990-2011
Spain Turkey
Age Effect (linear term)
Figure 8. Robustness Check: 10- versus 20-year Pseudo-panels. Quadratic Marginal Effects.
Note: Each point shows the estimated effect of age on the probability of not mentioning
immigrants/foreign workers as a group they would not like as neighbors. The dashed lines
show the 95 percent confidence intervals.
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alleviate the demographic pressures to the system and thereby help prevent a poten-
tial decrease in individual benefits (see Ivlevs 2008, 2012). Table 4 shows that
countries where individuals become more pro-immigration over the life cycle
(i.e., Group 3) also have less sustainable pension systems from the demographic
point of view — when compared to countries in Group 1 — as their populations are
on average older and display lower fertility rates.
As the effect of the pension systems on pro-immigration attitudes by age
depends on the assumption that immigrant workers are in the formal sector and
contribute to the pension fund, we explore the correlation with the skill composi-
tion of migrants. The higher the fraction of skilled immigrants, the higher the
likelihood that they will be in the formal sector. We would expect that individuals
would become more pro-immigration over the life cycle in countries where immi-
grants are more likely to work in the formal sector. However, Table 4 shows that
immigrants in Group 3 countries are only slightly more skilled than their counter-
parts in Group 1.
The evolution of pro-immigration attitudes over the life cycle can also be affected
through the labor market if the degree of complementarity between natives and
foreigners varies with age and/or labor market experience. Table 4 shows the rela-
tionship between the age effects by country and labor market variables to explore
this hypothesis. Consistent with models of complementarity between young and
older workers (Göbel and Zwick 2013), we find that individuals tend to become
more pro-immigration as they get older in countries where older individuals are
more likely to participate in the labor market and have a job.
Finally, we also attempt to shed some light on the drivers of the different gen-
erational effects across countries. Based on the idea that education is correlated with
stronger preferences for cultural diversity (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010), we first
explore whether countries that displayed more progress in terms of educational
attainment over time also experienced more improvements in attitudes toward immi-
gration across generations. The descriptive statistics in Table 5 do not support this
hypothesis, as the improvements in educational attainment between 1990 and 2000
are not correlated with cohort effects across groups of countries.8 In fact, countries
where the new generations are less pro-immigration experienced the largest increase
in educational attainment. We also explore whether older generations that grew up in
countries with higher levels of immigration tend to display attitudes toward immi-
grants more positive than those of younger generations. We use the share of inter-
national migrants aged 65 years or older. As most migrants tend to be young when
they arrive to the host country, a higher value of this variable may indicate that
immigrants have been in the country of destination for a longer period of time. We
find that countries where older generations are more proimmigration than their
8Unfortunately, we do not have data on educational attainment for all countries in the sample
before 1990 to capture changes over a longer time period.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































younger counterparts have on average older immigrants. This is consistent with
older generations in Group 1 countries having greater exposure to immigrants in
the past when compared to countries in Group 3.
In summary, while explaining the cross-country differences in the evolution of
attitudes toward immigration over the life cycle and across generations is beyond the
scope of this paper, an exploratory analysis suggests that demographic pressures and
the labor market outcomes of older workers are related to the estimated age effects
across broad country groups. At the same time, we find that the group of countries
where attitudes toward immigration became more negative for younger generations
also had a longer history of being recipients of immigrants than countries where
younger generations are more pro-immigration than their older counterparts.
Conclusions
Using household surveys for 25 countries between 2002 and 2014, we find that in
most economies, older individuals are more averse toward immigrants because of a
cohort or generational effect, not because they become more critical toward open
immigration policies over the life cycle. The results from our preferred model
specification show that in most countries, pro-immigration attitudes are either flat
or increasing with an individual’s age. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to
provide empirical evidence for a large number of countries consistent with the
predictions of models of political economy regarding attitudes toward immigration





65 years or older
(% of total)
Group 1 Negative cohort effects (Czech Republic,
Greece, and Israel)
29.4 21.4
Group 2 Cohort effects not different from zero
(Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Ireland
Portugal, Poland, Russia, Slovak
Republic, and Ukraine)
20.6 16.3
Group 3 Positive cohort effects (Austria,
Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain,
Finland, Netherlands, Norway,
Slovenia, Sweden, Estonia, Hungary,
United Kingdom)
26.1 13.9
Notes: Each group is defined using the sign and statistical significance of the coefficients associated with
birth cohort in Table 3, for attitudes toward immigrants of a different race or ethnicity. “Negative cohort
effects” mean that older generations had more positive attitudes toward immigrants than their younger
counterparts. The share of college graduates in the population comes from the Barro–Lee tables, while
the share of older migrants comes from DIOC 2000.
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policies by age. Thereby, this paper shows that the initial findings of Calahorrano
(2013) for Germany also hold for a larger set of countries. At the same time, the
finding that immigration attitudes are mostly driven by a cohort effect, with older
birth cohorts showing higher levels of opposition toward immigration, is at first
glance consistent with existing evidence showing that the more negative attitudes of
the elderly are largely explained by racial or ethnic prejudice — or compositional
amenities — than by labor market concerns (Card, Dustmann, and Preston 2012).
Nevertheless, we also find that older cohorts are more averse to immigrants from
their same race or ethnic origin, suggesting that the attitudes of older cohorts against
immigrants is not as much related to the ethnicity or race of immigrants so as to other
immigrants’ characteristics.
The estimated age and cohort profiles may have implications for the political
economy of immigration reforms in aging economies. If these profiles remain stable
in the future, the fact that the new cohorts will replace their older and more-averse-
to-immigration counterparts may result in an increased overall support for more
open immigration regimes over time. Accordingly, aging economies where individ-
uals become less averse to immigration throughout the life cycle may also improve
their overall attitudes toward immigrants as the elderly will represent a larger frac-
tion of the voting population. Nevertheless, as it is the case with any extrapolation of
current trends to the future, caution is needed as policy preferences can change in
response to many economic and political events over time.
Finally, the estimated age and cohort profiles reveal significant heterogeneity
across countries. For example, countries where older generations have more pos-
itive attitudes toward immigration also had a longer history of being recipients of
immigrants than countries where older generations are less pro-immigration than
their younger counterparts. Accordingly, countries where individuals become
more pro-immigration over the life cycle also have less sustainable pension sys-
tems. While we attempted to provide some insights on this heterogeneity across
countries, an investigation of the drivers of such differences represents an impor-
tant direction for future research.
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